Fully Participating  Voucher Programs and the Wisconsin Template: A Brick or a Breach in the Wall of Church-State Separation? by Todd, Greg
"FULLY PARTICIPATING" VOUCHER PROGRAMS AND
THE WISCONSIN TEMPLATE: A BRICK OR A BREACH
IN THE WALL OF CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION?
Greg Todd*
I. INTRODUCTION
The state of the nation's public school system is one of the most
challenging issues facing America at the beginning of the new millennium.
Americans have been inundated with media coverage detailing the
appalling conditions of American public schools,' the inefficiency of
spending and management in large segments of the public school system,
and the effect of a deficient educational system on children in the system!
School reform programs across the nation have grappled with the issue of
declining schools in a variety of ways One of the most popular yet
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would like to thank Lou Virelli, the articles editor responsible for this piece, and the senior and
associate editors who worked with him on this piece, for all of their dedication and hard work. I would
also like to thank my parents Terry and Joanne Todd, as well as my brother Andrew Todd, for their
continual support and encouragement throughout my academic career. I dedicate this piece to those
children and parents across America trapped in faling public school systems who are denied an equal
educational opportunity because such parents are financially unable, and no program exists to allow
such parents the choice, to send their children to a safe and academically effective school.
See e.g., Larry Aubry, Urban Perspective: Our Accountability for Student Achievement, L.A.
SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 1998, at A7, available in 1998 WL 11413496 (asserting that falling American urban
education most severely affects African American students); Ethan Bronner & Mary Ann Roser, A
Response on Low U.S. Test Scores: Nimble Minds, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Mar. 22, 1998, at
JI, available in 1998 WL 3601521 (noting that U.S. 12th graders are near the bottom of the
industrialized world in math and science performance); Linda Feldman, Battle to Be Education
Champs, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 29, 1998, at A7 (noting that the decaying state of the
education system was the number one issue for voters in the 1998 mid-term election); Adam Meyerson,
Education's Evil Empire, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at A15 (comparing the state of the U.S.
educational system to the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse and urging the educational
establishment to confess to its failures); Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton to Convene Math, Science Panel on
Education, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at A18, available in 1998 WL 2406026 (discussing a White
House initiative to curb poor test scores among American public school students).
2 [I he current inefficiency of spending on public schools is well documented. The United States
already spends large sums per student relative to other.., countries, yet average test results for
mathematics and science are poor .... ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., O.E.C.D.
ECONOMIC SURVEYS: UNITED STATES 81 (1993).
3 See Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of Sectarian Education: Establishment and Free Exercise
Clause Implications, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. RE'. 7, 14-16 (1993) (noting various plans that states
have used in school reform to provide aid to sectarian schools); see also Benjamin Akando, Six Ways to
Save Our Schools: It's Time to Set a National Goal-Oriented Education Agenda to Improve Students'
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controversial suggestions involves states and localities introducing school
choice programs.' Such programs either directly or indirectly provide state
aid to parents via the use of vouchers in order to send pupils to private
schools of their choosing.5 When these programs include sectarian schools
(by definition religiously-organized schools), thus becoming "fully
participating" voucher programs, they implicate the evolving constitutional
debate concerning the parameters of the separation of church and state as
asserted by the Constitution.6 Although the Supreme Court has grappled
with this issue a number of times, its jurisprudence continues to develop.
7
On November 9, 1998, the United States Supreme Court sent shock-
waves through decades of Establishment Clause jurisprudence when it
denied certiorari to an appeal from a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision
upholding The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program ("MPCP') which in
part included sectarian schools in a state-subsidized voucher program.
Both supporters and opponents of school choice had hoped the Court might
formulate a clear standard by which to analyze the constitutionality of
school choice plans that include sectarian schools, something that has
continued to elude the Court during its recent shift from the strict Lemon
testo toward a more accommodationist position."
Following Wisconsin's lead of including sectarian schools in its school
choice plan, a number of states have enacted or are considering enacting
similar voucher programs. 2 Thus, while the United States Supreme Court
Performance, Create Incentives for Good Teaching, Re-evaluate the Curriculum, and Develop New
Technology to Spur Learning, USA TODAY (MAGAZINE). Nov. 1993. at 62 (surveying programs being
used across the country to spur school reform).
4 "School choice" implicates a wide variety of programs beyond school vouchers, including
market-oriented public choice and intra- and inter-district public choice, as well as private school choice
that in turn may include sectarian and non-sectarian private choice. See Peter J. Weishaar. Comment
School Choke Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALA. L REV. 543, 543 n.8 (1994). This
Comment focuses on school voucher programs that include sectarian schools---'fully participating
voucher programs."
5 See Weishaar, supra note 4, at 543.
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. L The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause provide that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... " Id.
7 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of governmental support for religious
schooling on a number of occasions. See infra Part IL
s See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West Supp. 1997) (amending Wts. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West
1990) which had established a voucher system by which parents could choose which public or private
non-sectarian schools their children could attend, by adding sectarian schools to the state-supported
voucher program already in existence for selected public and non-sectarian private schools in
Milwaukee).
9 See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). Justice
Breyer voted to grant certiorari.
o See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See generally infra notes 118-122 and
accompanying text (discussing Lemon and the test it spawned).
" See infra Part IILB (demonstrating the recent shift of the Supreme Court tow-rd a more
accommodationist position on the subject of state aid to sectarian schools).
12 See Kristen K. Waggoner, The Milwaukee Parental Choke Progran The First Voucher System
to Include Religious Schools, 7 REGENT U. L REv. 165, 166 nn.7 & 10 (1996) (noting that
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, California. Washington. and Florida have
considered or are currently considering adopting school choice programs vdich would include sectarian
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has avoided the issue of school choice for now, it is only a matter of time
before the Court must stake out a position as to whether state-supported
voucher systems may include sectarian schools.
This Comment will analyze the constitutionality of the Wisconsin
program specifically, as well as school choice plans more generally, while
examining the development of the Court's First Amendment Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in relation to school choice. Further, this Comment
examines the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program as a prototype for a
"fully participating" voucher program, or a state-subsidized voucher
system that includes sectarian schools. Part II explores the recent history of
school choice and focuses on the structure and legislative development of
the Wisconsin school choice program. Part El evaluates the development
of Supreme Court Establishment Clause case law involving state aid to
sectarian schools, including the evolution and subsequent erosion of the
Lemon Test. In Part IV the focus shifts to possible future avenues for the
Supreme Court in considering voucher schemes, using the Wisconsin
scheme as a template to determine the constitutionality of similarly-
constructed voucher programs. This analysis supports the conclusion that,
in light of the Court's seeming willingness to accommodate a limited
relationship between the government and religion in education, carefully
tailored future school choice programs such as the Milwaukee plan that are
broadly applied in a neutral fashion while allowing parents real choices
between public, private secular, and private sectarian schools are likely to
survive constitutional scrutiny.
II. VOUCHER LEGISLATION
A variety of voucher programs have been touted as possible options for
the U.S. educational system. Various states have attempted to implement
different voucher proposals, with varying degrees of success in surviving
constitutional scrutiny. The Wisconsin scheme, a voucher system which
includes sectarian schools as permissible choices for low-income parents to
enroll their children, is the first of its kind in the nation, and its fate has
national significance.
A. Roots and Expansion
School voucher programs, one of a variety of school choice programs,
facilitate parents' ability to choose which schools their children will
attend. 3 Under such plans, parents would receive a voucher from the
schools, and that Ohio has instituted a program currently held up by litigation, while in Puerto Rico the
voucher program was struck down as it relates to private schools); see also Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's
Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 657, 685-99 (1998) (discussing school choice programs which include sectarian schools in
Vermont, Ohio, and Wisconsin which are (or were, in Wisconsin's case) currently facing legal
challenges).
13 See Jo Ann Bodemer, School Choice Through Vouchers: Drawing Constitutional Lemon.Aid
[Vol. 2:3
"FULLY PARTICIPATING" VOUCHER PROGRAMS
government, which would then be redeemable at schools that qualify under
the voucher program, in order to fund the cost of their child's education.'
The value of the voucher would usually be fixed, 5 and the state would also
establish a list of schools participating in the program, including
neighborhood public schools, public charter schools, private non-sectarian
schools, and/or private sectarian schools. 6 The voucher would cover the
full cost of the child's education at public school, but additional payments
by parents would be required for attendance at a private school if the cost
of the private school amounts to more than the cost of the public school.'7
A "fully participating" voucher program would allow parents to use the
voucher at any school participating in the program, including sectarian
private schools, while a "school choice/voucher program" would limit
participation to public and non-sectarian private schools."
The battle over voucher-based school choice programs is not peculiar to
the recent concern over the state of the nation's schools. Economist Milton
Friedman first popularized the concept of school vouchers in 1962.'9 Using
economic theory, supporters of voucher plans assert that if private and
sectarian schools are allowed to compete with public school systems,
healthy competition between the schools in the form of a free market
economy will develop." This would then result in schools that are "more
diverse, efficient, and effective than schools operating under the current
financing structure.' Vouchers funded by the government would be
distributed to students in order to attend sectarian schools, thus implicating
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause.?
Vermont was the first state to institute a school choice program? 3 Its
program provides tuition to students in towns that do not have a high
school, so that those students may attend a public or private school outside
the district. ' The program contains no specific bar against funding tuition
for attendance at religious schools; however, a recent attempt to apply the
tuition grants to students attending a parochial school resulted in a court
from the Lemon Test, 70 ST. JOHN'S L REv. 273, 280 (1996) (stating that vouchers are funding devices
giving parents the choice of schools for their children); id. at 280 n.22 (" [Plarents could take this
voucher to any school which agreed to abide by the rules of the voucher system.") (quoting Judith
Areen & Christopher Jencks, Education Vouchers: A Proposal for Divershty and Choice. in
EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS: CONCEPTS AND CoNTmovEsis 49.51 (George R. La Noue ed.. 1972)).
14 See Bodemer, supra note 13, at 280.
1S See id. at281.
16 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §119.23 (5) (c) (West 1991), amended by WIsC. STAT. ANN. §119.23
(West Supp. 1997).
, See id.
is See Ud
19 See MILTON FRIEDIAN, CAPrrALIM AND FREEDOM 93-96 (1962) (urging that competition
among schools in the form of vouchers would encourage efficiency and flexibility in the U.S. school
system).
See Weishaar, supra note 4, at 544.
21 Id.
= See id.; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
23 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 822 (1989); Viteritti, supra note 12, at 695.
24 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 822 (a) (1) (1989; Viteritti, supra note 12. at 695.
5 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 822 (a) (1) (1989).
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challenge and the suspension of the program for those students seeking to
attend the parochial school with state support.26
The Vermont plan is illustrative of existing school choice plans prior to
the Wisconsin scheme, which allowed parents flexibility in choosing which
public schools or secular private schools their children should attend. Such
plans typically either ignore religious schools altogether by being written to
comply with "the law,"' or specifically exclude sectarian schools from
their voucher schemes. 28 The Wisconsin program was to become the first
voucher-based school choice program in the country to include sectarian
schools as one of the choices qualifying families would be able to select.
B. A Wisconsin Experiment
Milwaukee, like many American cities, possesses a public school
system perforated with many of the problems commonly besetting other
inner-city school systems?2 Milwaukee public schools serve a large
number of poverty-stricken minority students who perform below both
their national and state classmates? °  These conditions convinced
Wisconsin Governor Tommy G. Thompson and Wisconsin State
Representative Annette "Polly" Williams to introduce the "Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program."3' The MPCP, enacted on April 27, 1990,
became the first school choice program in the United States to allow
parents to choose private schools over competing local public schools. 2
The original MPCP focused primarily on the educational needs of low-
income children.3 The program limited eligibility to a maximum of 1,000
students with family incomes of less than or equal to 1.75 times the federal
poverty level. These children received tuition vouchers of up to $2,500
26 See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999). The challenge
resulted when the local school board approved the tuition grants, which were subsequently declared
invalid and unconstitutional by the state department of education. See id. at 541-42. The local school
board then instituted the suit to obtain the tuition money from the state for the students attending the
parochial school. See id. at 544.
27 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 822 (a) (1) (1989) (providing for tuition for students "in
accordance with law").
28 See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 171 nn.29-30 and accompanying text (noting that the original
Wisconsin school choice program was limited and experimental, allowing only qualified low-income
Milwaukee residents to choose among neighborhood public schools, public magnet schools, and
nonsectarian private schools, thus excluding sectarian private schools).
29 See id. at 165 (citing Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 470 (Wis. 1992) (noting that "the
Milwaukee Public Schools serve a largely impoverished minority population of students who
consistently perform well below their counterparts in other areas of Wisconsin," a problem similarly
facing most urban public school systems)).
30 lto1.
31 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1991), amended by WIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West Supp.
1997) (establishing a parental choice program that allowed parents to choose neighborhood public
schools, public magnet schools, or non-sectarian private schools as their children's' schools under the
state voucher program).
32 See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 171 n.29.
33 See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460,462 (Wis. 1992) (noting the purpose of the MPCP).
34 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (2) (a) (1) (West 1991), amended by WISc. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West Supp. 1997).
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for use at non-sectarian private or public schools s  No more than 15
percent of the school district's membership could attend private schools
under the program. 6 Further, no more than 51 percent of a participating
school's total enrollment could consist of students in the MPCP program, a
number that was increased to 65 percent in 1993." If a participating school
received applications from more students than allotted to it under the
MPCP, the school had to select students randomly s
Prior to the 1995 amendments expanding the program to sectarian
schools, the MPCP was constitutionally challenged twice. In Davis v.
Grover,39 a number of civil rights groups and teachers unions charged that
the program violated both the state constitutional requirements of
uniformity within the school system' and the public purpose doctrine."
The state supreme court upheld the program, determining that the limited
and experimental scope of the program kept it from violating either the
uniformity clause or the public purpose doctrine. 4
The second challenge was filed by parents alleging that the MPCP's
exclusion of sectarian schools violated their First Amendment right to the
free exercise of religion and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection by denying them a government service based on the parent's
religious beliefs. 3 A federal district court rejected this claim, holding that
the direct method of payment to sectarian schools would violate the
Establishment Clause.4 The court asserted that if the MPCP included
sectarian schools, it would be similar to the program struck down as
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.
In 1995, the Wisconsin legislature revised the school choice statute in a
35 See id.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (5) (b) (West 1991), amended by WtsC. SrAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West
SupR. 1997).
See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 172 n.37.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (3) (West 1991), amended by WISe. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West
Supg. 1997).
480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992).
40 WIS. CONST. art. 10, § 3 (establishing that "the legislature shall provide by law for the
establishment of district schools which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable").
41 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has formulated and applied the public purpose doctrine in
deciding whether or not public expenditures are being used for a public purpose. The standard requires
that "public funds may be expended for only public purposes. An expenditure of public funds for other
than a public purpose would be abhorrent to the constitution of Wisconsin." See Jackson v. Benson.
578 N.W.2d 602,628 (Wis. 1998) (quoting Warren v. Nusbaum. 208 N.NV.2d 780,795 (Vis. 1973)).
'2 Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474-77.
43 See Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D.), vacared, 68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1215-16; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
45 413 U.S. 756 (1973); see Miller, 878 F. Supp. at 1215-16. This Comment does not address
competing Free Exercise claims that parents have asserted in arguing that they have a constitutional
right to state support for the religious education of their children. In this Comment. I attempt only to
address the negative aspects of the religious clauses: that is. what tyes of governmental support to
religions institutions (m this case, educational institutions) are permissible under, rather than mandated
by, the Constitution.
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number of ways.6 Most significantly, the amendments opened the program
to the participation of private sectarian schools. 7 In order to survive
constitutional scrutiny, the amendments significantly modified the method
by which funds were to be disbursed to the private schools, in particular
sectarian private schools." Rather than having the state pay private schools
directly, state checks would now be made payable to the parents of students
participating in the program 9 Parents could only redeem the tuition by
restrictively endorsing the check for the sole use of the private school."
The new scheme also required that participants be able to opt out of
religious activities at the sectarian schools with parental permission,' and
increased the eligibility of Milwaukee students from 1 percent to 7 percent
dUring the 1995-96 school year and 15 percent during the 1996-97 school
The amendments to the Wisconsin voucher program elicited a
predictable response: the traditional opponents of school choice schemes,
the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, and several teachers unions immediately
challenged the program in court. 3 The school choice opponents' suit
alleged that the MPCP violated the state and federal constitutions,
specifically Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin constitution,5 and the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution
Following a petition by Wisconsin Governor Thompson, the case was
removed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court," which issued a preliminary
injunction preventing 2,600 students from attending sectarian schools while
it determined the constitutionality of the program In response, businesses
and private donors raised over $1.8 million dollars to pay the tuition of the
displaced students, thus allowing them to remain in the schools of their
choice. 8 Subsequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court deadlocked, and the
See Budget Act of 1995-96, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (2) (a) (West Supp. 1997) (amending
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1991)).
47 See id.
49 See id.
49 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (4) (West Supp. 1997) (amending WIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West 1991)).
s See id.
51 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (7) (c) (West Supp. 1997) (amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West 1991)).
52 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (2) (b) (West Supp. 1997) (amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West 1991)).
53 See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 182 (citing Jackson v. Benson, No. 95-CV-1982, slip op. (Wis.
Cir. Ct., Dane County, Branch 17, Jan. 15, 1997)).
See Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 18 ("Nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of
reli ious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.").
See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
reli Von .... ).
See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 182-83.
See id. at 183 (citing Ellen Debenport, A Test for School Vouchers, ST. PETERSBURO TIMEs, Oct.
13, 1995, at A).
58 See Bodemer, supra note 13, at 283 n.48.
[Vol. 2:3
"FULLY PARTICIPATING" VOUCHER PROGRAMS
case was sent back to the circuit court, where the program was found to
violate the Wisconsin Constitution.' A state appellate court affirmed the
trial court decision,1 and the state supreme court again heard arguments
addressing the plan's constitutionality. On June 19, 1998, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the voucher plan, holding that the MPCP violated
neither the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution nor the
establishment, procedural requirements, uniformity, or public purposes
clauses and/or doctrines of the Wisconsin Constitution6
Following the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision, the opponents of
the plan agpealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the Court denied
certiorari. This move may have national significance as both
constitutional precedent and as an indication of the development of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
C. Resolving the Constitutionality of Wisconsin's
Voucher Program: National Significance
The significance of the constitutionality of Wisconsin's voucher
program is two-tiered. First, it became the first voucher plan in the United
States to specifically include sectarian schools in its funding scheme.'
Secondly, the precedential value of the plan may be far-reaching.
Following quickly on the heels of Wisconsin's experiment, Ohio and
Vermont instituted programs of their own which are similar in scope and
design."
In 1994, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that tuition reimbursement
for a student to attend a sectarian school out-of-state did not violate the
Vermont or U.S. Constitutions.6 As previously discussed, one school
district sued the State Department of Education to force the program to
fund the tuition of students attending a Catholic school.! Appearing to
retreat from its 1994 decision, Vermont's high court struck down the
See State ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140 (Vis. 1996). Three justices would have
held that the amended MPCP violated the state constitution, while the remaining justices would have
ruled that the opponents of the school choice scheme had not met their burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the M IPCP violated the state or federal constitutions. Thus, under state law the
case was sent back to the circuit court. See id.
60 See Peter M. Kimball, Opening the Door to School Choice in Wisconsin: Is Agostini v. Felton
the Key?, 81 MARQ. L REv. 843,846 n.25 (1998) (citing Jackson v. Benson, No. 95-CV-1982, slip op.
at 13 (Wis. Cir. C., Dane County, Branch 17, Jan. 15, 1997)).
61 Jackson v. Benson, No. 97-0270, 1997 WL 476290 (Wis. C. App. Aug. 22, 1997).
6 See Kimball, supra note 60, at 845-47 (noting that Wisconsin created the first voucher scheme to
specifically include private sectarian schools).
63 See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,632 (Wis. 1998).
6 See id., cert. denied 525 U.S. 997 (1998) (refusing to review the decision of the Wisconsin
supreme court upholding the MPCP).6s See Kimball, supra note 62, at 847 (stating that "it %as the only government-funded voucher
proam of its kind in the country").
See id. at 847 n.29 (discussing the Ohio and Vermont voucher programs).
See Campbell v. Manchester Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 641 A.2d 352 (VLt. 1994).
6s See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999).
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program as a violation of the state constitution.69
Ohio has adopted a voucher program almost identical to the amended
Wisconsin scheme. Known as the "Pilot Project Scholarship Program," it
awards 3,700 students in Cleveland, nearly 51 percent of public school
children, up to $2,250 in scholarships toward tuition at a number of
participating schools,70 including sectarian schools.7' The scheme was
upheld at the trial level on state and federal grounds,72 but was struck down
on appeal as a violation of the Establishment Clause.' On further appeal,
the Ohio Supreme Court, while invalidating the Ohio school choice
program on state constitutional grounds,74 held that the core of the voucher
program did not violate the federal Establishment Clause.75  The majority
applied the Lemon test, 6 finding that the program had a secular legislative
purpose, did not either advance or inhibit religion, and further, did not
excessively entangle religion and government."
Clearly, the legal outcome of any challenges to the Wisconsin voucher
program will have wide repercussions for these programs, and for those in
other states. 8 Such litigation would have the potential to alter the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The decision to deny
certiorari in the case of the MPCP, however, has resulted in an even more
complex and confusing Establishment Clause analysis for the Court as it
continues to grapple with church-state issues.
69 See id (holding that Vermont's school choice program violated the state constitution by
authorizing tuition reimbursements to sectarian schools).
70 See Adam Cohen, Cleveland's Program Gets Mixed Grades, TIME, Apr. 19, 1999, at 24.
71 1991 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.97.5 (A) (Anderson) (including sectarian schools in the Ohio
school choice program).
72 See Viteritti, supra note 12, at 691 n.162 (citing Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-I-193 & 96CVH-01-721 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas, Franklin County July 31, 1996)).
See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982 & 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583 (Ohio Ct.
Ap% May 1, 1997).
The Ohio supreme court struck down the Ohio program using the Ohio constitution's one-subject
rule, as delineated by Section 15(d), Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which states: "[n]o bill shall
contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." This rule, which in effect
invalidated legislation containing various unrelated topics, had no impact on the unrelated federal
religious clauses issues which the scheme also engaged. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203
(Ohio 1999).
75 See id at 216. The court did, however, find that the selection criteria which gave priority to
parents belonging to a religious group supporting a sectarian school violated the Establishment Clause.
See id. at 210. Nevertheless, a majority found that the selection criteria was severable from the voucher
scheme as a whole, thus allowing the program to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. See id. at 210-
11.76 Under the Lemon test the court must consider "the character and purposes of the institution that
are benefited, the nature of the aid the state provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and religious authority...." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).'n See id. at 211.
78 See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 166 n.7 (noting that Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey,
Connecticut, California, and Washington have considered, or are currently considering, adopting school
choice programs which would include sectarian schools, and that Ohio and Puerto Rico have instituted
programs currently held up by litigation). See generally Viteritti, supra note 12 (discussing the school
choice programs, including sectarian schools in Vermont, Ohio, and Wisconsin, which have faced or
wili face legal challenges).
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D. Certiorari Denied: Strategic Response or Muddled Move?
A cursory examination of the Court's denial of certiorari to the legal
challenge to the MPCP reveals very little, as generally "a denial of
certiorari does not have any precedential value." The Supreme Court may
deny certiorari for many reasons besides signaling its agreement with the
decision below, such as "the unimportance of the issue, the unusual
character of the particular facts, the desire to see the issue 'percolate' in the
lower courts, the controversial character of the problem, or the wish to
allow the political process time to consider the problem before an
authoritative resolution is obtained." c' Stone and his colleagues assert that
the Court's inaction on an issue when it denies certiorari "operate[s] as a
necessary means of mediating between the two (competing) ideas at work
in U.S. government: electoral accountability and governance according to
principle."8 ' Inaction by the Court guarantees that governance by
constitutional principle will not destroy electoral accountability by
"permitting the Court to defer to the political process without resolving the
issue either way." "
On one hand, there may indeed exist strong arguments that the Court
denied certiorari in Jackson for less strategic reasons. In particular, the
Court's case law in the area of state aid to sectarian schools is extremely
muddled." Further, the Court may have believed that the facts of Jackson
were configured in such a way that it should wait for a clearer case in
which to develop a standard for the constitutional analysis of vouchers.
8 '
Moreover, the Justices who voted to deny certiorari may also have done so
in deference to the electoral accountability of the legislators who enacted
the voucher plan, particularly in the face of confusing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Such deference allows legislation "to be tested in the actual
workings of our society."' Put more simply, the Justices, armed only with
a complex and confusing array of conflicting and overlapping decisions,
may have decided to wait and see how the emerging school choice schemes
perform within both the educational and constitutional systems before
passing constitutional judgment once again.
Nevertheless, an analysis attempting to determine what the Justices
were thinking when they denied certiorari is no more than conjecture.
Advocates and opponents of school choice will have to walt until the Court
decides to grant certiorari in a future challenge to a voucher scheme.
Therefore, the historical reasoning of the Court on the permissibility of
79 GEOFFREY R. SToNE Er AL, CONSITIUONAL LAW 146 (3d ed. 1996).
Id. at 145.
SId. at 89 (citing A. BICKEL, TIELEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 132-33 (1962)).
2 Id. at 90.
See infra Part I.L
84 The fact that the program is limited in scope and applies to only a small segment of a single
school district, as well as the indication that the drafters of the scheme may have designed the schem:
specifically to "fit" between the gaps created by the Court's muddled and confusing case law. are both
factors which may have caused the Court to back away from granting certiorari.
STONE, supra note 79, at 89 (quoting BICKEL, supra note 81).
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state aid to sectarian educational institutions remains vitally important in
attempting to divine whether the Court will continue to become more
accommodationist or pull back toward a more separationist position on the
issue of school vouchers.
11. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: THE FRAMERS AND
THE SUPREME COURT GRAPPLE WITH SCHOOL CHOICE
There has been a heated and long-running debate over the role of the
state in supporting religious education within the context of the
constitutional interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution." Paul Horwitz asserts that the ferocious and continuingnature of the conflict is such that "it seems safe to say only that the more
attention that is devoted to the topic, the less certainty there is about the
proper way to read the intentions of the framers of the Constitution with
respect to freedom of religion." " Thomas Curry notes that "[t]he opposing
sides have tangled in heated engagements, but have now settled into a kind
of trench warfare."'  The debate has been further constrained and
intensified by the lack of attention to the second clause, the Free Exercise
Clause,' and the almost unanimous focus on the first Religion Clause, the
Establishment Clause,9 as well as the familiar metaphor of the "'wall of
separation' between church and state," 9' which maintains "a powerful grip
on the judicial and historical imagination .... " This metaphor wasdeveloped by two Framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights:
Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson.9 Williams used the wall of
separation concept to demonstrate his "dread of the worldly corruptions
which might consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness
were not maintained," ' or his belief that the church, rather than the state,
needed to be protected against encroachment by the other." Jefferson, on
the other hand, coined the metaphor to stress his belief in the importance of
preventing religious influence over the state.9 These two views were to
The Religious Clauses of the U.S. Constitution state that "Congress shall make no law respectingan establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.Paul Horwitz, The Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section2(a) and Beyond, 54 U. TORONTO. FAC. L. REV. 1, 16 (1996) (noting that the length, intensity, andattention paid to the interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the U.S. Constitution only add to the lack
of clarity as to the appropriate boundaries between church and state).
88 THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAOE
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT vii (1986).
89 See U.S. CONST. amend. . ("Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]."). This Comment does not expand on the absence of Free Exercise analysis in Religious
Clauses analysis, but rather focuses on the development of Establishment Clause precedent.
90 See id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . .91 See Horwitz, supra note 87, at 16.
92 Id.
93 See id. at 17.
94 id, at 17.
95 See id.
96 See id. Jefferson asserted, "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
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become the two "polar opposite[]" positions which were to characterize
interpretations of the Religion Clauses," and subsequently, the debate over
the constitutionality of state aid to sectarian educational institutions until
the present day. The Jeffersonian view, which I will label the strict
separationist position, holds that the Religion Clauses were designed to
guard against any religious influence over the secular affairs of state.'
Conversely, the Williams view, which I will label the acommodationist
position, asserts that the Clauses guard against intrusion by the state into
the religious affairs of the nation in order to protect religious pluralism and
the establishment of a national religion." These two interpretations have
been adopted by different factions of the Supreme Court within the line of
cases dealing with government aid to sectarian schools, and more
generally, church and state issues. Each interpretation has dominated
different eras of the Court's recent history.
In trying to determine where the Supreme Court may be moving on
Establishment Clause issues, it is useful to divide modem Supreme Court
Establishment Clause jurisprudence into two distinct eras. Each era
demonstrates the differing interpretations of the Establishment Clause
traceable all the way back to the framing of the Constitution. First, the
period of case law ranging from the middle of the twentieth century to the
early 1980s evidences a strong trend toward strict enforcement of the
separation between Church and State. Changes in the make-up of the
Supreme Court during the early 1980s resulted in a significant shift in the
Supreme Court's approach to the Establishment Clause. This second era
has evidenced a move toward a more accommodationist position on state
aid to sectarian schools.
A. Pre-1980 Case Law: Trending Toward A Strictly Enforced
Establishment Clause
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Since World War II, the United
States Supreme Court has grappled with the sometimes competing interests
of protecting the rights of Americans to exercise freely the religious faith of
their choosing, and prohibiting the state from establishing religion,
particularly in the context of state support for sectarian 
schools.,§
American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church
and state." 1ML at 17 n.70 (citing M.D. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WtLDERNESS: REuGION AND
GOvERNmENT IN AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL HISTORY 1 (1965)).
' See i.
9' See i.
9See i&
1W U.S. CoNST. amend. L
1o' See Kimball, supra note 62, at 851 (citing the "seminal case" of Everson v. Board of Edue.. 330
U.S. 1 (1947)).
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In Everson v. Board of Education, 'm the Court, led by Justice Black,
traced the history and intent of the First Amendment, and embraced
Jefferson's view that there should exist a wall of separation between church
and state. °3 The Everson opinion elevated the Establishment Clause to a"new height" and "balanc[ed] the requirements of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses in favor of the latter."' 04 The Everson Court upheld
a New Jersey program that reimbursed parents for the costs of
transportation of their children to and from school, including the costs of
parents of parochial school pupils,' °S thus "carv[ing] out an exception for
certain state aid,"'o6 while tipping the scales toward stronger Establishment
Clause enforcement.' °7 The Court determined that the program was neutral
in its relation to believers and non-believers because it paid the
transportation costs of sectarian school children as part of a general state
program that reimbursed the parents of all children in all schools in New
Jersey.' °8 This neutrality standard was to become the basis for much of the
Court's later Establishment Clause case law.'O' Thus, the Court laid the
foundation for a long-standing struggle to determine a balance of
interaction between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses."
The Court remained silent on the issue of state aid to sectarian schools
until 1968, when it upheld a New York law requiring public school boards
to purchase textbooks and freely lend them to both public and private
schools for no charge." In Board of Education v. Allen, the Courtembraced Everson as precedent and once again adopted a neutrality
102 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
103 See id. In Everson, Justice Black wrote:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and
state."
Id. at 15-16.
104 Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under
Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REa. 113, 130 (1996) [hereinafter Viteritti, Choosing
Equality].
105 i3See Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
10Kimball, supra note 62, at 852.
107 See Viteritti, Choosing Equality, supra note 104, at 129.103 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
109 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9 (1993); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
241-42 (1968).
11 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
H Allen, 392 U.S. at 238 ("A law of the State of New York requires local public school authoritiesto lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven through 12; students attending private
schools are included").
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standard with which to judge state aid to sectarian schools."
2 The Court
also incorporated parts of an earlier test from a case that held prayer in
public schools to be unconstitutional."' Using this additional test, the
Court examined the purpose and primary effect of the statute."" The Court
applied this two-part test and found that the New York statute had a secular
purpose of advancing the education of students,
'" and a permissible
primary effect as tenuous as that in Everson."
6 This was the embryonic
stage of an Establishment Clause test that the courts would apply unevenly
for the next thirty-five years.
Eight years later, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,"' the Court considered a
program that allocated state funds in order to reimburse the expenses of and
supplement the salaries of private school teachers in Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island, respectively."' The Court synthesized a new test in applying
the Establishment Clause to state aid to religious schools. This three-part
test expanded the two-prong approach in Allen by forbidding not only any
governmental action that (1) has no secular purpose or (2) has a primary
effect of advancing religion; but also action that (3) cultivates excessive
entanglement between church and state."9 This test, conventionally known
as the "Lemon test," has "subsequently been considered the standard for
an Establishment Clause analysis."'2
Though holding that the purpose of the statutes-improving secular
education-was sufficient to survive the first prong of the test, the Lemon
Court struck down both programs by applying the third prong of the test.
2'
The Court concluded that the programs created excessive entanglement
because they presented the potential for administrative entanglement
between state and religious institutions, and political divisiveness along
religious lines."
1t2 See id at 241-42 ("Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), is the case decided by this
Court that is most nearly in point for today's problem").
3 See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203. 205 (1963) (holding that the reciting of
the Lord's Prayer and Bible readings in public schools, although not mandatory. violated the
Establishment Clause).
"4 Id. at 222 (The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpos and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment [exceeds the
Constitution's grant of legislative power]").
11 See Allen, 392 U.S. at 243 ("The express purpose of § 701 was stated ... to be [the) furtherance
of the educational opportunities available to the young. Appellants have shown us nothing... [that
contradicts] its stated purpose.").
116 See id at 244 ("Perhaps free books make it more likely that some children choose to attend a
sectarian school, but that was true of the state-paid bus fares in Everson.").
" 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Il See id.
", Id. at 615 ("[Bloth statutes foster an impermissible degree of entanglement."). These prongs of
the Lemon test will be expanded upon later in the Comment. See infra Part IV.A.
'3 Kimball, supra note 62, at 854.
.2 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (discussing the need to examine the "resulting relationship between
the government and the religious activity").
' See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-25 (discussing the issue of administrative entanglement engendered
by state aid to religious schools, as well as the possibility for political polarization along religious
lines).
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The Court reached its high-water mark of stringent application of the
Establishment Clause in Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist,' in which the Court invalidated a tuition reimbursement
program very similar in structure to that at issue in Wisconsin. The
program authorized a number of direct payments to private schools and
parents, including: payments to schools for the purpose of maintaining and
repairing equipment and facilities to protect students' health, welfare and
safety;'2 reimbursements to low income parents for the gurpose of aiding
them in paying their children's tuition at private schools;' and tax relief to
parents who did not qualify for the reimbursements.2 6
The Court first found that, because the payments were directly made to
private schools (most of which were affiliated with the Roman Catholic
Church2 1) without restrictions on usage, the payments had the primary
effect of advancing religion.'2 The Court used similar reasoning to
invalidate the reimbursement scheme,' noting that New York could not
guarantee that the funds would be used for secular and neutral purposes."
A key element of the Court's analysis was the Justices' assertion that while
the payment scheme was an important factor in determining the
constitutionality of the scheme, it was not the only factor. 3 ' Instead, the
Court focused on the overall effect of the program, noting that the tuition
grants were being offered as incentives to encourage parents to send their
children to religious schools by facilitating their ability to afford such
schools. 32  The Court therefore held that the Constitution had been
violated, regardless of whether state aid was ever used for religious
purposes or whether parents were free to spend the money as they
wished.'33 The Court also invalidated the third program, noting that the
program in effect created the same incentive as the reimbursements for
sending a child to a sectarian school.'" Thus, in Nyquist, it appeared that
the Court had foreclosed any state-funded voucher program from surviving
constitutional scrutiny if it provided an incentive for parents to enroll their
children in religious schools.'35
1 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) ("Each
[provision], as written, has a primary effect that advances religion and offends the constitutional
prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion.") (internal quotation marks omitted).See id. at 762.
125 See id. at 764.
12 See 142 at 765.
127 See id. at 774.
12 See id
129 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973) ("New
York's tuition reimbursement program also fails the 'effect' test .....
130 See id.
131 See id. at 773-74.
13 See id. at 785-86. The Court held that the incentive, albeit indirect and unable to make sectarian
schools as affordable to parents as public schools (i.e. free), was a strong enough effect to constitute
encouraging religion, and thus violated the Constitution. See id.
133 See id. at 786.
134 See id.
135 See Kimball, supra note 62, at 857.
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B. Post-1980: The Tide Turns Toward Accommodation
The Supreme Court's strict enforcement of the Establishment Clause
started to erode at the beginning of the 1980's. The make-up of the Court
drifted toward the conservative end of the ideological spectrum following
the elections of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, both
conservative Republicans, in 1980 and 1988, respectively. Buoyed by
social conservatives, whose agenda included securing state support for
religious schools, the Reagan and Bush administrations appointed justices
whom many Court-watchers perceived as supporting a less restrictive
Establishment Clause interpretation.' The "high wall of separation began
to fall"'3 as early as 1980, when in Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Regan," a bare majority of Justices upheld a New
York law which distributed funds to private schools, including religious
schools, in order to administer state examinations and collect enrollment
and attendance data." The Court relied on its reasoning in its 1968 case
Board of Education v. Allen to infer that it was both possible and necessary
to isolate secular activities from the religious environment of sectarian
schools in order to survive constitutional scrutiny."'
This trend continued with Mueller v. Allen,'' a decision that proved to
be a landmark shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence." The
Minnesota law at issue granted tax breaks to parents for the costs of tuition,
textbooks, and transportation, regardless of whether their children were
enrolled in public, private, or sectarian schools.' 3 The Court distinguished
the Minnesota tax relief scheme from that in Nyquist by noting that the
Minnesota scheme provided the tax benefit to all parents, regardless of
whether their children were in private schools, thus makingpublic funds
available to schools based on the private choices of parents.' The Court
readily admitted that the program provided the same financial benefit to
sectarian schools as would direct aid, but asserted that because the parents
were making "numerous, private choices" as to where to apply the aid, the
State was not establishing or approving of religion.'o Thus the Court
13 President Reagan appointed Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981, Antonin Scalia in 1986, and Anthony
Kennedy in 1988. Cf. Kimball, supra note 62, at 857 n.109. President George Bush appointed David
Souter in 1990 and Clarence Thomas in 1991. These appointments, along %ith the pre-ReaganiBush
conservatives, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, who tended to vote conservative-
accommodationist on Establishment Clause issues, created a conservative-accommodaionist majority
on the Court.
SViteritti, Choosing Equality, supra note 104, at 135-36.
133 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
1 See id. at 657.
140 See Viteritti, Choosing Equality, supra note 104, at 136.
141 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
42 See Viteritti, Choosing Equality, supra note 104, at 136.
143 See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390 n.1.
I" See id. at 399 (drawing a distinction between the aid schemes at issue in Ny-qulst and the
Minnesota tax relief package).
145 Id.
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implicitly declined to overrule Nyquist by concluding that the Minnesota
scheme did not have the effect of advancing religion.4
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, called the Lemon test into
doubt for the first time, stating that while Establishment Clause questions
have been "guided... by the three-part test", the Lemon test was merely a
"helpful signpost in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges." 47 The
Court also refused to engage in an empirical analysis of the program in
question, which would have shown that parochial school parents were
using the vast majority of tax benefits. 4' Thus the Court appeared to
abandon the proscription against grants or tax benefits which created
incentives for parents to send their children to sectarian schools by
facilitating the financial ability of parents to enroll their children in such
schools. 49 The Court achieved this by ignoring evidence demonstrating a
strong incentive on the part of parents in Minnesota to do just that.'"4 In the
wake of Mueller, the Court began to apply the Lemon test as a "mere
formality rather than as an effective tool in assessing the constitutionality
of state aid to schools." '5
The next significant Establishment Clause case decided by the Supreme
Court was Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind.'2
The Court upheld a Washington state program that paid vocational
educational grants to blind students so they could attend post-secondary
educational institutions, including public, private secular, and private
sectarian schools. 53  The Court embraced the incentive standard it had
abandoned in Mueller, determining that the program did not provide a
financial incentive for students to choose sectarian educational institutions,
and that it did not bestow additional benefits on students who chose to
attend sectarian institutions.' Further, the Court stressed that the same
ingredient present in Mueller, that the aid was disbursed to sectarian
institutions only as a result of "genuine and private choices of aid
recipients," was also present in Witters. 1 The Court ultimately applied the
Lemon test in finding that the aid would not be used to promote religion,
but instead to aid disabled students. This iteration of the Lemon test was
far less rigorous than that applied in Nyquist, or even in Lemon itself.
The Court further eroded the Lemon test in Zobrest v. Catalina
146 See i at 402. In fact, Rehnquist, writing for the majority, suggested that the "primary effect"
prong of the Lemon test was in fact being relaxed. See Viteritti, Choosing Equality, supra note 104, at
136. But see Kimball, supra note 60, at 860 n.135 (noting that Mueller "effective[ly] revers[edJ"
Ny~uist)
"Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
14 See id. at 402.
149 See Kimball, supra note 62, at 860.
150 See id.
151 11L
152 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
'53 See id. at 483. In this particular case, the post-secondary educational institution the student chose
was a Bible college.
154 See id. at 488.
155 kd. at 487.
156 See id. at 488.
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Foothills School District,'" where the justices upheld the use of state funds
to supply sign-language interpreters to students in sectarian schools.5 The
Court "all but ignored" the three-prong test, instead relying on Witters and
Mueller.' In finding that the program was neutral, the Court revived the
neutrality standard first applied in Allen, noting that because the program
neutrally provided a benefit to "a broad class of citizens without reference
to religion," it was not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge."W The Court also reaffirmed the validity of aid that is disbursed
to sectarian schools via "genuinely independent and private choices."' 6
The Justices further held that since the program included both public and
private schools, including sectarian schools, it provided no financial
incentive for parents to send their children to sectarian schools., The
Court continued to formally cling to the Lemon test, however, refusing to
overrule it outright.' 6
The trend of erosion of the Lemon test continued with the Supreme
Court's decision in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia.64 This case examined the constitutionality of a state university
funding scheme that distributed payments to outside contractors for student
group publications, but which denied a Christian student group publication
support.L ' The Court overturned the denial of publication funds using a
different analysis than that of the Lemon test. ' Although the central
controversy of the case was over free speech and viewpoint discrimination,
Justice Kennedy nevertheless developed this new approach to
Establishment Clause analysis.'" He applied two standards in his analysis:
(1) the traditional neutrality standard, examining whether the government
action was neutral; and (2) whether any benefits to religious institutions
were contingent and negligible.' 6s The Court determined that the funding
scheme was neutral because it had a secular purpose of supporting "various
student enterprises... in recognition of the diversity and creativity of
student life." ' 6  Further, the benefits to religious institutions were
negligible and contingent, as the use of the financial support was for purely
secular actions, which included funding printed materials for a student
170
group.
15 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
"' See id.
" Kimball, supra note 62, at 860.
160 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 9.
161 Id.
162 See id at 9-10.
163 See Kimball, supra note 62, at 862.
164 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
1' See id. at 822.
16 See id at 822-23.
167 See id at823.
16S ee id at 839, 843-44.
169 See id at 840. The Court noted that "[p]rinting is a routine, secular, and recurring attribute of
student life." d at 844.
im See id at 843-44. Kennedy argued that "[a]ny benefit to religion [under the funding scl-mn] is
incidental to the government's provision of secular services for secular purposes on a religion-neutral
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The most recent case involving state aid to private sectarian schools,
Agostini v. Felton,17' also provides the strongest support for the
constitutionality of voucher programs. The Court determined that New
York City's Title I program, which disbursed funding to disadvantaged
children via the compensation of public teachers who taught disadvantaged
children in sectarian schools, was in fact constitutional. 7  In Agostini, the
Court declared that an injunction against the program, which was originally
upheld by the Supreme Court,7 7 had in fact been upheld by an analysis that
was no longer good law.' 74 The Court's analysis in Aguilar v. Felton was
based on strict use of the Lemon test. In Aguilar, the Court applied Lemon
in finding that the Title I program created excessive government
entanglement because public employees would have to be closely
monitored by the state in order to guarantee that they did not teach or
approve religion. 75 Overturning Aguilar is the closest the Court has come
to directly overruling the Lemon test.
In Agostini, the Court focused on its analysis in Witters and Nyquist to
determine what types of direct government aid were permissible.'76 The
Court compared the challenged program to the use of a government
employee's paycheck, a situation in which the employee could sign over
part or all of the paycheck to a religious cause or group, but "only as a
result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals."'"
The Court reaffirmed several standards of analysis from previous opinions,
further finding that: the aid in question was not in the form of direct grants;
that an empirical analysis of the numbers or percentages of religious school
students receiving neutral aid was not relevant; and that the program did
not create any financial incentive for parents to send their children to
sectarian schools, because it was disbursed to sectarian and secular school
pupils on a neutral, secular basis.
7
1
This holding represents the first time that the Court has overruled a
separationist decision. It is the strongest signal to date that the Supreme
Court continues to shift toward a more accommodationist position
concerning state aid to sectarian schools. The Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence remains muddled, however, due to its denial of
certiorari to the challenge to Wisconsin's voucher scheme.
basis." Md.
1 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
172 See id. at 240 (finding that the program "is perfectly consistent with the Establishment Clause").
173 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (holding that a permanent injunction against the
NYC Title I program for offering funding for public teachers to work in sectarian schools was
constitutional, since "the program remains constitutionally flawed...").
175 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (effectively overturning Aguilar).
175 See hi at 234 (stating that "pervasive monitoring would be required").
,76 See id. at 235.
in AL at 226 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 (1986)).
178 See id. at 231-32. "The services are available to all children who met the Act's eligibility
requirement, no matter what their religious beliefs or where they go to school." Id. at 232.
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IV. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE IN A POST-LEMON ERA:
WILL VOUCHERS FOR SECTARIAN SCHOOL PUPILS
SURVIVE SCRUTINY?
Because the Supreme Court has declined specifically to overrule
Lemon, inconsistency and confusion characterize its current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence." The Court has expressed significant frustration in
trying to grapple with Establishment Clause cases.ra Further, scholars and
Supreme Court justices alike have pointed out that at least five justices on
the current Court have "personally driven pencils through the [Lemon
test's] heart." 81 Thus it was predicted the Court might grant certiorari to
Jackson v. Benson in order to establish a clear standard. '
The Wisconsin voucher program represents a suitable template with
which to examine the constitutionality of voucher programs because it was
specifically designed to overcome the hurdles the Supreme Court has
placed in the way of state aid to sectarian schools. When applied to the
various competing standards of constitutionality under the Establishment
17 See Bodemer, supra note 13, at 298-99; Viteriti, Choosing Equaliy. supra note 104. at 141
Waggoner, supra note 12, at 188 (noting that "perhaps no other constitutional provision has engendered
as much confusion and controversy as the Establishment Clause" (quoting Eric J. Segall. Parochial
School Aid Revisited The Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test and Religious Uber 28 SAN DIEGO L
REV. 263 (1991))).
18 Justice Scalia has asserted:
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us
(and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at
will When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it... when wve wish to
uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling
its three prongs "no more than useful signposts." Such a docile and useful monster is worth
keeping around, at least in a somnolent state. one never know when one might need him.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 503 U.S. 384. 399 (1993) (Scalia. J.
concurring) (intemal citations omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist has also assailed the contradictory and
arbitrary nature of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, noting that under existing Supreme
Court jurisprudence:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps of the
United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class.
A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George
Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A State may lend classroom
workbooks, but may not lend workbooks in which parochial school children write, thus
rendering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools but
may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial schools to the public zoo or natural
history museum for a field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the
parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different building; speech and
hearing "services" conducted by the State inside the sectarian school are forbidden, but the
State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian school.
Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it must take place outside of
the parochial school, such as in a trailer parked down the street. A State may give cash to a
parochial school to pay for the administration of state-written tests and state-ordered reporting
services, but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects. Religious
instruction may not be given in public school, but the school may release students during the day
for religious classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with its truancy
laws.
Walace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting).
1 Bodemer, supra note 13, at 299 n. 127 (quoting Justice Scalia in Lamb's Chapel. 503 U.S. at 393).
1 See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 167.
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Clause, it demonstrates a strong likelihood of surviving constitutional
scrutiny. This analysis in turn may be applied more generally to similarly
constructed voucher programs.
A. Vouchers Under the Lemon Test: A Necessary Formality?
Although recent Supreme Court decisions have cast doubt on the
Lemon test as the controlling standard in Establishment Clause challenges
to state aid to sectarian schools, the Court has not expressly overruled the
test. Thus, the Lemon test remains the most well-defined test the Supreme
Court has embraced to date, and is helpful in adding context to possible
competing analyses of Establishment Clause challenges."3 Although the
Lemon test has begun to erode, a voucher program that survives Lemon's
scrutiny, would, a fortiori, survive the less stringent scrutiny recently
suggested by some justices. Therefore, the Lemon test represents a suitable
standard with which to analyze the most recent program of state aid to
sectarian schools to come before the Supreme Court, the Wisconsin MPCP.
1. The First Prong: Secular Legislative Purpose
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that the challenged statute
have a secular legislative purpose."N This is the test's easiest hurdle, as
legislation may easily be drafted to conform to this requirement.
The Wisconsin plan has three specific goals: (1) low-income families
should have at least some of the options available to better off families; (2)
low-income pupils may have a better chance of enhanced performance in
private schools; and (3) giving parents this choice would strengthen public
schools by forcing them to concentrate on satisfying parents and students.' 5
The MPCP, as amended in 1995, was "intended to provide a greater array
of educational options and increase the number of students who can
participate in the program."' 6  Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "[a] State's decision to defray the cost of educational
expenses incurred by parents-regardless of the type of schools their
children attend-evidences a purpose that is both secular and
understandable."'87 The Wisconsin Supreme Court echoed this reasoning
when it upheld the program, affirming that "[t]he propriety of providing
educational opportunities for children of poor families... goes without
question... [and] evidences a purpose that is both secular and
understandable."' Therefore, the Wisconsin program easily passes the
183 See Kimball, supra note 62, at 866 (noting that the Lemon test may be eroding, but the
components of the test are useful in structuring a general analysis of voucher programs).
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
1 See Kimball, supra note 62, at 866 (citing HOWARD I. FULLER & SAmIuS B. WHIm, WISCONSIN
POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EXPANDED SCHOOL CHOICE IN MILWAUKEE: A PROFILE OF ELIGIBLE
STUDENTS AND SCHOOLS 3 (1995)).
196 Id at 866 (stating that this satisfies the first prong of the Lemon test).
187 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
M Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 612 (Wis. 1998).
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legislative purpose prong of the Lemon test.
2. The Second Prong: Primary Effect
The second prong of the Lemon test, that the challenged statute's
primary effect must be one that "neither enhances nor inhibits religion," '
is more difficult for state aid programs to overcome."* At the outset, it is
important to note that the Court, in recent iterations of the Lemon test, has
refused to play the numbers game by way of empirical analysis of the
amount of aid that actually ends up going to private schools.' Instead,
recent decisions have focused on the funding mechanism by examining
whether state aid flows to the sectarian school directly or indirectly,'7" and
the neutrality principle by analyzing whether the benefit is a neutral one
applied to a broad class of people not defined by religion."5 Indeed, the
Wisconsin high court again recognized this when it noted that: "[a]lthough
the lines with which the Court has sketched the broad contours of this
inquiry are fine and not absolutely straight, the Court's decisions generally
can be distilled to establish an underlying theory based on neutrality and
indirection...." 94
The Court has attempted to apply a principle of neutrality that asks
whether the funding from the state primarily advances or inhibits
religion.'" Scholars point out that this inquiry becomes difficult when the
Court attempts to determine "which of a statute's many effects is primary
and which is secondary."'6 The Court has relied on three major
requirements to determine whether a statute's effect is primary: (1)
whether the state funding can be separated from the school's religious
mission; (2) whether the class benefiting from the program includes a broad
number of persons who will use the benefits for secular purposes; and (3)
whether sectarian schools are disbursed funds directly from the state or
receive "an attenuated benefit from funds distributed to parents or students
attending the religious school." "7
The Court, however, has rejected the separability requirement as a
criterion in recent cases utilizing the Lemon test.' ' Its latest Establishment
Clause cases have upheld a variety of programs of state aid to sectarian
schools without "ensuring that the aid was completely separate from the
"7 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
190 See Bodemer, supra note 13, at 295 (stating that "evaluating legislation wider the second prong
of the Lemon test" is more difficult).
... See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,228-29 (1997); see generally Mueller. 463 U.S. at 388.
192 See, e.g., Bodemer, supra note 13, at 295.
9 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819. 840 (1995).
'94 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 613 (Wis. 1998).
195 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
196 Waggoner, supra note 12, at 194.
1 Waggoner, supra note 12, at 194-95.
"' See generally Zobrest v. Catalina Ills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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religious function of that educational institution." 199 The other two criteria,
however, represent the heart of the eroding Lemon test still being utilized
by the Court.
The requirement that the state aid be a neutral benefit distributed in a
non-discriminatory fashion to a broad class of people not defined by
religion was originally laid out in Nyquist.m In Zobrest, the Court further
clarified its position on the constitutionality of "neutral" state benefits by
upholding a program of state aid that was made available to all individuals,
regardless of whether or not they attended public or sectarian schools, on a
non-discriminatory basis.2°' The Wisconsin program clearly meets this
requirement, as it applies to parents of a broad class of students (children of
low income families),2 whether or not they attend public, private secular,
or private sectarian schools, and does not discriminate against pupils on the
basis of religion (the program provides for random selection of those who
apply for the program,20 and allows pupils to waive involvement in the
religious activities of the school).2
The third requirement for neutrality, whether or not sectarian schools
receive aid directly from the state or as a result of genuine private choices
by the beneficiaries of the aid, is identical to the twin branch of the larger
primary effect analysis, whether or not the state aid flows to the sectarian
school directly. As a result, they can be analyzed together.
Nyquist represents the strongest case supporting the assertion that the
Wisconsin plan violates the primary effect prong of Lemon.2" Nyquist
struck down a New York statute that gave parents of sectarian school
students income tax relief.0 The Court noted that while the state aid at
issue in Nyquist was in fact distributed to the parents directly, this indirect
funding was only one factor to be considered.' The key to the
constitutional violation in Nyquist was not only that the state aid had the
indirect effect of funding religious education, but that the only parents
eligible for the tax breaks or grants under the scheme were those sending
their children to private schools, most of which were sectarian.2" Thus the
199 Waggoner, supra note 12, at 196.
2M See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973)
(requiring that a state draft a statute that "maintains an attitude of neutrality, neither advancing nor
inhibiting religion").
21 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8.
See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (2) (a) (1) (West 1991), amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West Supp. 1997).
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (3) (West 1991), amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West
Sup. 1997).
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(7)(c) (West Supp. 1997) (amending WiS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West 1991)).
See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 199; see generally Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756.
See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756.
2M See id. at 780-89 (noting that simply because the reimbursements are delivered to the parents
rather than the schools does not compel a contrary result, as the effect of the aid is unmistakably to
provide financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions).
2M See id. at 768.
2W See id. at 762-64.
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program provided a strong incentive for parents to send their children to
private, sectarian schools by reducing the cost of sectarian education for
parents desiring such an education for their children.
10
The 'Wisconsin plan appears to survive scrutiny, even under Nyquist.
Not only does the Wisconsin plan mandate that the state aid be disbursed to
parents," but all low-income parents qualify for the aid, refardless of
whether or not their children attend public or private schools." Aid only
reaches private sectarian schools as a result of genuine private choices on
the part of parents as to whether they wish to send their children to public
or private school, a permissible scheme inferred by Nyquist and expressly
affirmed in Mueller v. Allen and its progeny.?' Because under the
Wisconsin plan parents do not have improper incentives to send their
children to sectarian schools, and the plan has an indirect funding structure,
the third criteria for neutrality and the second branch of the primary effect
prong of the Lemon test are met. Thus the Wisconsin program, and
similarly constructed voucher programs, are likely to survive the second
prong of the Lemon test.
3. The Third Prong: Excessive Entanglement
The third prong of the Lemon test requires the Court to strike down any
provision which will result in "excessive government entanglement with
religion" .2 1 There has been little guidance by the Court as to the
parameters of this prong,2 5 and it has been criticized as an "'insoluble
paradox', 'catch-22', 'curious and mystifying', 'redundant', 'superfluous',
and without 'constitutional foundation.' 2" Additionally, the Court in
Witters expressly refused to use the entanglement prong in its analysis
when it upheld the Washington statute at issue. 
217 Thus, even if a statute
violates the third prong of the Lemon test, there is some debate as to
whether the statute would be rendered unconstitutional. Nevertheless,
because the Court has not expressly rejected the third prong of the Lemon
test, analysis of voucher programs under this prong is instructive.
There are two types of entanglement under the Lemon analysis:
210 See id. at 785-86.
211 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (2) (a) (1) (West 1991), amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West Supp. 1997).
12 See id.
213 See Zobrest v. Catalina Hills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1. 9 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,486-87 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388. 399 (1983).
214 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,613 (1971) (quoting \Valz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664.674
(1970)).
215 See Weishaar, supra note 4, at 568.
216 Waggoner, supra note 12. at 192 (citing Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd, 426 U.S. 735,
768-69 (1976) (White, L, concurring) (quoting earlier opinion)); see Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
615 (1988); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 661-71 (White, J., concurring in judgment, dissenting in part); Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-10
(1985) (Rehnquist, 1, dissenting).
217 See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481.481 (1986).
Apr. 2000]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
administrative entanglement and political divisiveness.2" For a plan to
engender administrative entanglement, the plan must cause"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance."2 9
Upon a cursory examination of the Wisconsin plan, there appears to be a
significant degree of entanglement between religious schools and the
government. The state is required under the scheme to ensure that students
eligible for the program are chosen randomly, to develop uniform financial
accounting standards, and to accept independent financial audits from each
participating school every year, as well as to conduct performance and
financial evaluative audits for official submission."' At least one scholar
argues that these reuirements amount to excessive entanglement between
church and state. Other analysts, however, point out that these
requirements "do little more than ensure that private schools meet the
minimal standards required of all schools in the state." 223 Because minimal
performance and auditing requirements are within the bounds of the State's
power to regulate state accredited schools, including private and sectarian
schools, the Wisconsin scheme probably does not amount to administrative
entanglement.
The Court has frequently acknowledged that the overlapping of church
and state may create emotional issues which may in turn cause political
division along emotional lines, thus implicating the second branch of the
excessive entanglement prong.2A The Court's concern is that a long-term
voucher program would, over time, become entrenched and increase in
cost, thus necessitating increased funding and in turn, "generating their
own aggressive constituencies."'  In a context as "deeply emotional
[as] ... Church-State relationships, the potential for seriously divisive
political consequences needs no elaboration."'
The Court has applied the political division branch of excessive
entanglement in a somewhat restrictive fashion. The Court in Mueller
restricted the political division branch of excessive entanglement to state
aid schemes involving direct payments to sectarian schools or teachers in
sectarian schools.22 Additionally, the Court in Nyquist refused to allow the
prospect of political divisiveness alone to determine the constitutionality of
a state aid scheme. m Further, in Agostini v. Felton, the Court's latest
218 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
219 id at 619.
22 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (7) (West 1991), amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (7)
(West Supp. 1997).
MI See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (9) (West 1991), amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (9)
(West Supp. 1997).
2= See Weishaar, supra note 4, at 568-69.
= Waggoner, supra note 12, at 193. Further, Waggoner cites Pierce v. Society of Sisters, whichheld that the state has a proper interest in the manner in which sectarian and other private schools
perform their secular educational activities. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).2 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797 (1973).
"5 See id.
6Id.
=7 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,403 (1983).
= See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797. Scholars also point out that if aid were to be paid directly to
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pronouncement concerning the third prong of the Lemon test, the Court
held that neither administrative entanglement nor the danger of political
divisiveness were sufficient in themselves to create an excessive
entanglement.' This pronouncement by the Court has further weakened
the third prong of the Lemon test.
Because Wisconsin's voucher program does not directly pay sectarian
schools or teachers, the political divisiveness analysis becomes irrelevant to
the scheme's constitutionality. Further, since the plan implicates neither
the administrative entanglement nor the political divisiveness arms of the
excessive entanglement prong, it appears to survive the third prong of the
Lemon test, and thus the Lemon test itself, provided the Court continues to
use the Lemon test in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
B. Alternatives to the Lemon test
Certain Justices, while concurring in judgments based on the Lemon test
itself or some iteration thereof, or while determining the constitutionality of
other statutes under the Establishment Clause unrelated to school aid, have
formulated alternative standards With which to review Establishment
Clause claims. In particular, standards formulated by Justices O'Connor
and Kennedye ' have received some scholarly attention as possible
emerging approaches to First Amendment litigation applicable to school
choice and voucher cases.
1. The Endorsement Test
Although there is plenty of room for interpretation within the Lemon
test itself, scholars have identified the endorsement test as a possible
revision to the Lemon test. 2 Although no member of the Court has applied
this new test to school funding cases, Justice O'Connor introduced the
theory in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnely, an Establishment Clause
case regarding religious symbols on display in a public forum' She
further enunciated the theory in her concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree,7
where the Court invalidated a statute enacted to provide a period of silence
in public schools for voluntary prayer or meditation.
sectarian schools or their teachers, it would violate the second prong of the Lemon test anyway. See
Waggoner, supra note 12, at 194.
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,233-34 (1997).
2 See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the development of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test).
23' See infra Part 1V.B.]I (discussing the development of Justice Kennedy's coercion test).
23 See Bodemer, supra note 13, at 298-99.
233 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (writing separately "to suggest a
clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine").
z4 See id. at 671 (deciding whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a
municipality from including a nativity scene in its annual Christmas display).
23 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing %vith the Court that the Alabama
statute at issue violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
236 See i. at 60 (concluding that the Alabama statute was enacted "for the sole purpose of
expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each
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Justice O'Connor reformulated Lemon into the endorsement test in both
of her concurrences by first collapsing the secular purpose and primary
effect prongs of the Lemon test into a single purpose requirement" This
requirement forbade the government from purposefully supporting or
criticizing religion.3' The Court, meanwhile, applied a deferential and
limited review of legislative intent. 9 Critics of vouchers argue that this
reformulated prong would be unconstitutional given the Court's
protectiveness of young children against impression by state-supported
religion. Such critics argue that because students would have no choice
but to attend the better-performing private schools, the state is endorsing
sectarian schools through the voucher system.2 t Scrutiny of the Wisconsin
program, however, demonstrates that this is simply not the case. All low-
income families in Milwaukee are eligible for the program,A and the
scheme includes religious and secular private schools. 3 Aid to religious
schools occurs only after individual choices on the part of low-income
families, who have a wide variety of private secular, sectarian, and public
educational institutions from which to choose.
The second prong of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test is a
reformulation of the excessive entanglement provision of the Lemon test.
The endorsement test would focus on administrative entanglement,
abandoning the already limited examination of political divisiveness!" As
previously indicated, voucher programs like Wisconsin's are likely to
survive the administrative entanglement hurdle. 245
Five current Supreme Court Justices appear to have embraced some
form of the endorsement test as it relates to public displays of religious
symbols.2 This analysis was echoed by the Court in its Rosenberger
Establishment Clause analysis.247 A plurality of the Court noted in Capitol
schoolday" and that "[s]uch an endorsement is not consistent with the established principle that the
government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion").
See id. at 69-70 (asserting that "[t]he endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content it
gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and effect"); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at
689 (noting that focusing on endorsement "clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device").
See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 203 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-91).
See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74-75 (stating that "[i]f a legislature expresses a plausible secular
purpose... in either the [statute's] text or the legislative history... courts should generally defer to
that stated intent").
2Q See Weishaar, supra note 4, at 571.
241 See id. at 571-72.
242 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (2) (a) (7) (West Supp. 1997).
243 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (2) (a) (1) (West Supp. 1997) (amending Wis. STAT. ANN. §
119.23 (West 1991)).
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "theconstitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character of the government activity that might
cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself').
24 See supra Part IV.A.3.
M See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1995). A plurality
of the Court, in affirming the right of the Klu Klux Klan to place a cross on public property, rejected the
claim that a neutrally drafted law would be invalid under the endorsement test. See id.
247 See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837-45 (1995) (holding that there
was no Establishment Clause violation when the University of Virginia withheld authorization for
payments to outside contractors of printing costs of a student publication because the paper promoted a
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Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette that "[i]t has radical
implications for our public policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid
whenever hypothetical observers may-even reasonabl)-confuse an
incidental benefit to religion with state endorsement." 2 No member of the
Court has ever applied the endorsement test to school aid cases."
' If the
Court should adopt this standard for school choice cases, however,
vouchers such as the Wisconsin scheme are likely to survive scrutiny under
the test, as they meet both prongs of the endorsement test.
2. The Coercion Test
Another alternative to the Lenon test that has received some critical
scholarly attention is the coercion test.' Like the endorsement test, the
coercion test has been applied narrowly to a limited portion of
Establishment Clause case law that does not include school choice and aid
provisions. "
The Court applied this test for the first time in Lee v. Weisman
z and
invalidated the use of nonsectarian prayer at public school graduation
ceremonies on the grounds that it violated the Establishment Clause."
3 The
Court determined that students were coerced into participating in the prayer
because the graduation ceremonies, which included prayer, were controlled
and directed by the state, and students were compelled to attend them.2,
At least one critic of vouchers charges that MPCP-style voucher
programs violate the coercion test by compelling students either to attend
sectarian schools or forfeit their chance of a better education.' Underlying
such an application of the coercion test is the assumption that "students
under a voucher plan would have no real choice but to attend the 'better'
private sectarian schools,"'  and that public schools would be left under-
funded and thus deficient.7 This analysis ignores two important
characteristics about voucher plans. First, there is no evidence that
sectarian school students outperform their public school and secular private
school counterparts."' It is misleading to argue that giving parents the
belief in a certain deity).
24 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd, 515 U.S. at 768 (emphasis in original).
29 See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 203.
2' See id at 205-06; Weishaar, supra note 4, at 571-72.
251 See eg., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-94 (1992) (applying Establishment Clause analysis
to a case dealing with the use of non-sectarian prayers at public school graduations).
22 See id.
See id at 599 (upholding the right of a 14-year old who objected to the use of prayer at her
middle school graduation).
2 See id at 586 (stating that "[e]ven for those students who object to the religious exercise, their
attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real sense
obligatory, though the school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt of the
diploma").
2% See Weishaar, supra note 4, at 572-73. But see Waggoner, supra note 12. at 205.
Weishaar, supra note 4, at 571.
See id at 571-72.
25 See Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis. 28 COLrtt. J.L. & Soc.
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choice of where to send their children to school via a voucher program in
any way amounts to coercion 9 -there is simply no evidence that parents
would feel coerced to choose a sectarian over a private secular school.2w
Second, the program statutorily protects children from direct coercion by
religious authorities to become involved in religious activities by means of
an opt-out provision.26' In short, the MPCP falls within the category of
voucher programs that would survive constitutional scrutiny under such an
analysis. Thus the coercion test, should the Court ever choose to apply it to
school aid provisions, is not likely to invalidate voucher programs that
include sectarian schools.
V. CONCLUSION
As the debate over education reform has intensified, school voucher
proposals have grown in popularity. Early school aid case law under the
Establishment Clause restricted the types of state aid that could be
permissibly granted to sectarian schools. The Lemon test was formulated
and strictly enforced against state aid to religious schools. With the rise of
the Rehnquist Court, however, the Lemon test has begun to significantly
erode, thus creating wider gaps in the wall of separation between church
and state. Additionally, two new Establishment Clause tests, the
endorsement and coercion tests, have become the focus of speculation as to
whether either might replace the Lemon test. A voucher system that
indirectly funnels aid to public, sectarian, and private secular schools via
parents' individual private choices, and which applies to all children,
regardless of which schools they attend, is likely to survive scrutiny under
any of these tests. Wisconsin's Milwaukee Parental Choice Program is
such a program.
Wisconsin's voucher program avoids a violation of the Lemon test by
having a secular purpose, having a primary effect that neither benefits nor
inhibits religion, and avoiding excessive government entanglement,
whether administrative or politically divisive. The Wisconsin scheme and
similarly constructed voucher programs also would survive scrutiny under
the endorsement and coercion tests should the Court decide to apply them
to future school aid cases. Thus, while the Court has avoided ruling on the
validity of the MPCP, such an analysis is a helpful predictor of what the
Supreme Court is likely to do should it change its mind and grant certiorari
to cases challenging other school choice programs, such as those in Ohio or
Vermont.
PROBs. 423,454 (1995); see also Waggoner, supra note 12, at 205.
29 See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 205 (labeling as "absurd" the argument that "giving citizens the
means to improve themselves equates to coercion").
26 See id. This is not to suggest that the main purpose behind voucher programs is to promote
religious education, but rather that MPCP-style programs might attract parents to sectarian schools for
other non-academic, albeit secular, reasons, such as school safety, discipline, or the general social and
ethical environment and community of a particular sectarian school or class of schools.
261 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (7) (c) (West Supp. 1997) (amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West 1991)).
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Although the Supreme Court has declined to decide directly the
constitutionality of the Wisconsin program, the failure of the Court to strike
down the MPCP may indicate a continuing accommodation of a less rigid
relationship between church and state. Regardless, the Court appears to be
toiling toward an Establishment Clause jurisprudence for school vouchers
that is centered on neutrality.m Without wading into the policy arguments
for or against vouchers for sectarian schools, this Comment demonstrates
that such programs are constitutional and can be added to the government
arsenal as one more option for states and localities pursuing educational
reform, as they struggle to reverse the decay and disorder of their public
school systems.
m See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 219.
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